{"id":105064,"date":"2025-03-06T01:26:00","date_gmt":"2025-03-06T06:26:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/?p=105064"},"modified":"2025-12-19T11:17:21","modified_gmt":"2025-12-19T16:17:21","slug":"arrest-warrants-state-reactions-icc","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/105064\/arrest-warrants-state-reactions-icc\/","title":{"rendered":"Mapping State Reactions to the ICC Arrest Warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant"},"content":{"rendered":"

Editor\u2019s Note: This article is part of our ongoing symposium on the ICC and the Israel-Hamas war<\/a>. This article and the interactive map were first published on Nov. 22 and have been updated since.<\/em><\/p>\n

On Thursday, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced it had issued arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav Gallant, the former defense minister, in connection with <\/span>alleged crimes<\/span><\/a> committed in the ongoing <\/span>armed conflict<\/span><\/a> between Israel and Hamas. In doing so, the Court rejected as premature Israel\u2019s <\/span>challenge<\/span><\/a> to the Court\u2019s jurisdiction.\u00a0 The Court\u2019s decision to issue a warrant for the sitting Prime Minister of a state, which is notably not a party to the Rome Statute, also demonstrates the Court\u2019s embrace of its prior <\/span>controversial<\/span><\/a> decision on immunity, namely that customary international law does not provide immunity for heads of state from criminal prosecution in international criminal courts, or at least not before the International Criminal Court. This position could be a source of tension for those states that support a customary international law rule providing head of state immunity before international tribunals, but are also bound by treaty to comply with the Court\u2019s warrants and requests for arrest.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

States have now provided a range of reactions to the ICC\u2019s decision, which can shed light on their views regarding these and other legal controversies as well as on the Court\u2019s legitimacy and standing in the world. Some include political support or political pushback, and some include statements regarding their own intent to comply with the arrest warrants. The latter may be relevant to ongoing consideration of customary international law governing immunity. Thus far, however, states generally have refrained from opining directly on the immunity issue as such. Inferring a state\u2019s views on immunity is complicated further still by statements that do not distinguish between a sitting head of state and a (former) defense minister.\u00a0 Several states have signaled their intent to comply with the arrest warrants or even called on others to do the same.\u00a0 Other states have remained circumspect about their intent to do so.<\/span><\/p>\n

We have begun the project of collecting, analyzing, and categorizing official statements in response to the ICC\u2019s announcement, which we consolidate below and will continue to update. If we have missed anything, please send us an email at <\/span>lte@justsecurity.org<\/span><\/a>. For mapping purposes, we have used the following categories of statement:<\/span><\/p>\n

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  1. Political support and support for compliance<\/li>\n
  2. Compliance alone\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
  3. Political support alone<\/li>\n
  4. Non-committal<\/span><\/li>\n
  5. Critique on policy grounds\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
  6. Critique on only legal grounds and\/or suggest non-compliance<\/li>\n
  7. Critique on both policy and legal grounds and\/or suggest non-compliance<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    This project is inspired by a similar <\/span>mapping exercise<\/span><\/a> that I undertook alongside Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, Priya Pillai, and Elvina Pothelet, on U.S. strikes in Syria in 2018.\u00a0 As we highlighted then, States vary greatly in the language they deploy to respond to such events, and many statements include a fair amount of nuance that may require some parsing in order to classify into neat groups like the above.\u00a0 Complicating matters further, there are often statements from multiple actors within the state that may add color to the formal positions coming out of foreign ministries, or which may alternatively reflect non-cleared views.\u00a0 There will be some statements on which reasonable minds may differ regarding how to classify.\u00a0 For example, Germany\u2019s spokesperson issued a formal statement foregoing a decision on compliance until a \u201cforeseeable\u201d visit would bring the matter to a head, but then added color to that formal statement of non-commitment by saying, \u201cI find it hard to imagine that we would make arrests on this basis.\u201d\u00a0 We thus moved Germany to category E due to the suggestion of non-compliance.\u00a0 Similarly complex: Italy\u2019s foreign minister issued a carefully worded non-committal and pledge to \u201cevaluate\u201d with allies the decision and how to respond, but the defense minister stated that Italy would \u201chave to\u201d carry out the arrests. \u00a0 In cases of conflicting statements within the state, we have classified the state according to the formal statement issued by the foreign ministry, but have included additional statements that provide readers with a more nuanced account.<\/span><\/p>\n

    For their extraordinary efforts in this process, I am grateful to Clara Apt, Audrey Baillette, Isaac Buck, Charlotte Kahan, Maya Nir, and Michael Pusic for canvassing official statements and to Pooja Shah for creating the interactive map.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Update:<\/strong> Several states\u2019 public positions have evolved since we first started classifying them, and some have shifted categories. For example, Germany has shifted its position\u2013toward compliance\u2013and France has raised head of state immunity as a possible barrier to suit, at least with respect to a sitting Prime Minister. We have updated the table and map accordingly.<\/span><\/p>\n

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