{"id":129177,"date":"2026-01-20T08:52:39","date_gmt":"2026-01-20T13:52:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/?p=129177"},"modified":"2026-01-20T08:52:39","modified_gmt":"2026-01-20T13:52:39","slug":"unmarked-aircraft-drug-boat-perfidy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/129177\/unmarked-aircraft-drug-boat-perfidy\/","title":{"rendered":"Using an Unmarked Aircraft to Attack an Alleged Drug Boat: Is it Perfidy?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Reports have surfaced that a military aircraft used in the highly controversial Sept. 2, 2025, strike on an alleged drug boat, as well as a follow-on strike as two survivors were clinging to its wreckage, was imitating a civilian aircraft (see <\/span>here<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>here<\/span><\/a>). Reportedly, the aircraft had no military markings and carried weapons internally, but its transponder was \u201csquawking\u201d its military status. The aircraft apparently swooped in low over the boat, which turned back toward Venezuela, before attacking it and killing nine on board. Two shipwrecked crewmembers and the remains of the boat were then destroyed in a second strike (see analysis of the attacks <\/span>here<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>here<\/span><\/a>).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Most discussion of disguising the aircraft\u2019s military character has focused on whether doing so violates the law of armed conflict (LOAC) prohibition on <\/span>perfidious attack<\/span><\/a>, which involves feigning protected status under LOAC to kill the enemy. This article explains that using an aircraft not marked as military in character is lawful during peacetime and that, had there been an ongoing armed conflict (there was not), the attack would not have been perfidious under LOAC. However, if conducted as reported and if an armed conflict had been underway, the operation might have violated a separate LOAC obligation requiring that only military aircraft exercise belligerent rights, such as conducting attacks.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is important to clarify at the outset that both the first and second strikes on the boat were clearly unlawful on other grounds (see <\/span>here<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>here<\/span><\/a>, and <\/span>here<\/span><\/a>). Moreover, it is difficult to see any operational merit in using an aircraft that appeared to be civilian to conduct the attack, although in the face of the administration\u2019s lack of transparency, the wisdom of doing so is difficult to assess. That said, it is telling that subsequent attacks, which were likewise unlawful, appear to have been carried out by appropriately marked military platforms.<\/span><\/p>\n

Which Body of Law Governs?<\/b><\/h3>\n

The administration claims that the drug boat strikes took place in the context of a non-international armed conflict to which LOAC rules apply. That claim is simply wrong (see the <\/span>Just Security<\/span><\/i> collection<\/span><\/a> of articles on the attacks). The U.S. sinkings of alleged drug boats, at least until the U.S. attack on Venezuela (and still in cases lacking a sufficient nexus to that conflict), were governed instead by international law rules applicable in peacetime. This is because neither of the two requirements for the existence of a <\/span>non-international<\/span><\/i> armed conflict, an armed conflict between a State and an \u201corganized armed group,\u201d was satisfied at the time of the attack (or any time since). As explained <\/span>previously<\/span><\/a> in greater depth, 1) the drug cartels and gangs concerned do not qualify as \u201corganized armed groups under LOAC, and 2) the violence between the United States and the drug cartels and gangs had not reached the requisite degree of intensity on Sept. 2 (DoD\u00a0<\/span>Law of War Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a>, \u00a7 17.1.1; <\/span>Tadi\u0107<\/span><\/i><\/a>, para. 70).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

As a consequence, LOAC rules such as the <\/span>prohibitions<\/span><\/a> on attacking civilians and civilian objects, the qualification of shipwrecked individuals as protected persons who are <\/span>hors de combat<\/span><\/i><\/a>, and the prohibition on <\/span>perfidy<\/span><\/a> do not apply. Instead, the strike was an \u201cinternationally wrongful act\u201d by the United States in violation of the right to life of those aboard the boat and an act of murder by some of those involved under the domestic criminal law of States that enjoy prescriptive (lawmaking) jurisdiction over the incident, such as the State of nationality of the participants in the strike and of those who were killed (see our discussion <\/span>here<\/span><\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n

As to the aircraft that conducted the Sept. 2 strike appearing to be of civilian character, the <\/span>Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation<\/span><\/a> provides that \u201cEvery aircraft engaged in international air navigation shall bear its appropriate nationality and registration marks\u201d (art. 20). However, the Convention explicitly excludes \u201cState aircraft,\u201d a category that includes \u201c[a]ircraft used in military\u2026 services\u201d from its reach (art. 3; with limited exceptions that are not relevant here). While there is a strong peacetime practice among States of identifying military aircraft using national rondels or insignia, tail markings, serial numbers, and unit or service identifiers, there is no international law obligation dictating how State aircraft must be marked. The use of an aircraft that appeared to have civilian (civil) status to mount the attack made it no more unlawful than it already was.<\/span><\/p>\n

Did the Attack Violate the Perfidious Attack Rule? (had there been an armed conflict)<\/b><\/h2>\n

As noted, there was no armed conflict, and therefore, no violation of the prohibition on perfidious attack. However, even if an armed conflict had been underway, the use of an aircraft that appeared to be civilian would not, in the attendant circumstances, have qualified as a perfidious attack.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

There is universal agreement that under customary law, it is prohibited to kill or wound the enemy by resorting to perfidy (\u00a7 5.22.2; see also ICRC <\/span>Customary IHL<\/span><\/i> study, <\/span>rule 65<\/span><\/a>). The DoD <\/span>Law of War Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a> defines perfidy as \u201cacts that invite the confidence of enemy persons to lead them to believe that they are entitled to, or are obliged to accord, protection under the law of war, with intent to betray that confidence\u201d (\u00a7 5.22.1). A long-standing prohibition (see, e.g., 1863 <\/span>Lieber Code<\/span><\/a>, art. 16; 1899 <\/span>Hague II<\/span><\/a> and 1907 <\/span>Hague IV<\/span><\/a> Regulations, art. 23(b)), in treaty law, it is found in <\/span>Article 37(1)<\/span><\/a> of the 1977 Additional Protocol I for Parties to the instrument (the United States is not a Party). That provision extends the prohibition to perfidious capture.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The applicability of the rule in non-international armed conflict is not entirely settled, an important point in light of the (flawed) U.S. claim that the attack occurred in that context. The DoD <\/span>Law of War Manual<\/span><\/i> discusses perfidious attack only in the context of an international armed conflict (conflict between States), although it does not expressly exclude application in a non-international armed conflict. However, the prevailing, and better, view is that it is likewise barred in such conflicts, with the ICRC setting out strong support for that position in its <\/span>Customary International Humanitarian Law<\/span><\/i> study\u2019s <\/span>catalogue<\/span><\/a> of practice. This is also the conclusion of a study by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (<\/span>NIAC Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a>, \u00a7 2.3.6). And the <\/span>Rome Statute<\/span><\/a> of the International Criminal Court includes perfidy as a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflict (arts. 8(2)(b)(xi) and 8(2)(e)(ix), respectively).<\/span><\/p>\n

There is no question that civilian status is among the protected statuses that may not be feigned to attack the enemy. Indeed, \u201cfeigning civilian status and then attacking\u201d is one of the five examples of perfidious attack in the DoD <\/span>Law of War Manual<\/span><\/i> (\u00a7 5.22.3). And there is equally no question that the rule extends to aircraft. The international group of experts who prepared the <\/span>HPCR Manual on the International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare<\/span><\/i><\/a> (Harvard AMW Manual) concluded that \u201c[i]t is perfidious for a military aircraft to feign the status of a civilian aircraft,\u201d giving as examples \u201cpainting civilian markings on a military aircraft\u201d (commentary to rule 114(b); The <\/span>Harvard AMW Manual<\/span><\/i> confirmed that leveraging perfidy to \u201ckill or injure an adversary\u201d is unlawful in the aerial environment (rule 111). The Canadian <\/span>Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels<\/span><\/i><\/a> manual likewise provides that \u201cusing false markings on military aircraft such as the markings of civil aircraft\u201d is among the \u201cexamples of perfidy in air warfare if a hostile act is committed\u201d (\u00a7 706(3)(a)).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The aircraft at issue in the Sept. 2 U.S. strike did appear to be a civilian aircraft. And, while it was apparently squawking its military status, those aboard the boat that it was engaging would have been unable to acquire that signal. However, that does not end the analysis. There are two reasons the Sept. 2 attack would not constitute perfidy had it occurred during an armed conflict (as a reminder, it did not).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

First, a perfidious attack requires a specific intent. As noted in the DoD <\/span>Law of War Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a>, \u201cThe key element in perfidy is the false claim to protections under the law of war <\/span>in order to secure a military advantage<\/span><\/i> over the opponent\u201d (\u00a7 5.22.1, emphasis added). That military advantage can, for instance, be catching the enemy unaware or preventing the enemy from realizing the need to flee.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Operationally, it is difficult to imagine how such military advantages could have played a role in the U.S. decision to use the aircraft. As has been demonstrated in the <\/span>35<\/span><\/a> drug boat strikes to date (and surely would have been apparent at the time of the first strike at issue here), U.S. forces can attack them with impunity, without risk, and with great tactical success. While it is true that the Sept. 2 strike was the earliest, it is hard to imagine why a very robust force would be concerned that a boat in transit that already had been located by U.S. forces might be able to get away if it spotted a military aircraft in the area, and that therefore they had to employ one appearing to be civilian to lull the crew into complacency. And in terms of vulnerability to attack from those aboard the boat lest they be alerted, it is unlikely that the boats posed much of a threat to intercepting aircraft or vessels had they been identifiable as military platforms – that is, reporting to date has not indicated the boats were armed with weapons that could have posed such a threat. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. armed forces conceived a plan to sneak up on the drug boats to execute the strike successfully. This being so, the operation would not amount to perfidy had there been an armed conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n

A second possible reason is that perfidious attack is limited to circumstances in which the specific intent is to feign protected status in order to kill or wound persons. The prohibition arguably does not extend to actions targeting objects; in other words, killing or wounding must be the intention, not the consequence. As noted in Bothe et al.\u2019s <\/span>New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict<\/span><\/i><\/a> commentary on Article 37, \u201csabotage or the destruction of property as such through the use of perfidious deception is not prohibited (page 234; see also <\/span>Dinstein<\/span><\/a>, page 305).<\/span><\/p>\n

By this interpretation, even if the U.S. forces intended to feign civilian status to trick the boat crew, <\/span>if <\/span><\/i>the boat allegedly laden with drugs was the target, not the crew, the requisite intent may not have been present. True, those aboard the boats were almost certainly going to be incidentally killed or wounded. However, <\/span>if <\/span><\/i>the mission was solely to stop the shipment of drugs, not to deprive the cartels or gangs of those who transport them, that would be relevant to application of the perfidy rule.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite the lack of access to all the facts, the intent requirements described above would seem to preclude characterization of the use of the seemingly civilian aircraft to mount the Sept. 2 attack as perfidy (again, assuming the prohibition on perfidy applies during non-international armed conflict and according to the erroneous U.S. view that such a NIAC was ongoing).<\/span><\/p>\n

Was the Use of the Aircraft to Conduct the Attack Lawful?<\/b><\/h2>\n

It is well-settled in international law that \u201conly military aircraft are entitled to engage in attacks in armed conflict\u201d (DoD <\/span>Law of War Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a>, \u00a7 14.3.3.1; see also <\/span>UK LOAC Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a>, \u00b6 12.34). This long-standing rule is based on the authoritative, albeit non-binding, 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare (art. <\/span>13<\/span><\/a>).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The <\/span>Harvard AMW Manual<\/span><\/i> experts agreed with the rule in principle, but concluded that it did not bar the use of civilian aircraft during non-international armed conflict, which the administration (wrongly) claims to have been engaged in on Sept. 2 (<\/span>Harvard AMW Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a>, rule 17(a) commentary). To support its position, it pointed to the use of law-enforcement aircraft during such conflicts.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

No such caveat appears in the DoD <\/span>Manual<\/span><\/i>, even though it post-dated the AMW project. Similarly, the UK<\/span> Law of Armed Conflict Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a> fails to distinguish the application of the rule in international and non-international armed conflict. And the German <\/span>Law of Armed Conflict Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a> appears to accept the rule in all armed conflict, noting, \u201cOnly military aircraft are entitled to conduct air operations. This also applies to all enforcement actions that do not in themselves entail the use of weapons such as intercepting, diverting or forcing to land other aircraft for the purpose of inspection\u201d (\u00b6 1115).<\/span><\/p>\n

If the Harvard AMW experts are right, there would be no violation of the limitation. But if the rule applies to all armed conflicts, the question becomes whether the aircraft is of military character.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The <\/span>Harvard AMW Manual<\/span><\/i> experts defined a military aircraft as \u201cany aircraft (i) operated by the armed forces of a State; (ii) bearing the military markings of that State; (iii) commanded by a member of the armed forces; and (iv) controlled, manned or preprogrammed by a crew subject to regular armed forces discipline\u201d (rule 1(x), rule 13(j)). The requirement of being marked is based on the Hague Rules of Air Warfare (<\/span>art. 3<\/span><\/a>).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The UK\u2019s LOAC manual is in agreement with the marking requirement (\u00b6 12.10), as is the <\/span>Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a> (\u00a7 704) and the German manual(\u00b6\u00b6\u00a0 349, 1103). By these standards, the aircraft’s failure to be marked as military precludes its qualification as a military aircraft, and therefore it was unlawful for it to exercise the belligerent right of conducting attacks (again, assuming the limitation applies in a non-international armed conflict, and that such a conflict was in fact occurring, which it was not).<\/span><\/p>\n

Interestingly, the DoD <\/span>Law of War Manual<\/span><\/i><\/a> takes a broader approach: \u201cMilitary aircraft may be understood as aircraft that are designated as such by a State that operates them. The United States has not ratified a treaty that requires certain qualifications before an aircraft may be designated as military aircraft.\u201d It cautions that while \u201c[m]ilitary aircraft are customarily marked to signify both their nationality and military character \u2026 circumstances may exist where such markings are superfluous\u201d (\u00a7 14.3.3). In explanation of when such marking may be superfluous, a footnote cites as an example situations in which \u201cno other aircraft except those belonging to a single state are flown\u201d (citing the 1976 <\/span>Air Force Pamphlet 110-31<\/span><\/i><\/a>).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Yet, it merits note that the Air Force Pamphlet cited by the DoD\u2019s <\/span>Law of War Manual<\/span><\/i> also states that \u201cwhile <\/span>engaging in combat operations<\/span><\/i>, military aircraft, as entities of combat in aerial warfare, are also required to be marked with appropriate signs of their nationality and military character\u201d (\u00a7 7.4, emphasis added). In other words, it appears that despite the mention of situations in which marking is superfluous in the DoD <\/span>Law of War Manual, <\/span><\/i>the<\/span> U.S. position tracks those of other States vis-\u00e0-vis the circumstances at hand. At least with respect to belligerent rights, such as the right of attack, the aircraft concerned must be appropriately marked as military.<\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusions<\/b><\/h2>\n

From the analysis above, a number of conclusions can be drawn about the Sept. 2 use of an aircraft to conduct the attack on the alleged drug boat.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. As there was no armed conflict, the law of armed conflict, including the prohibition of perfidious attack, was inapplicable. Instead, the U.S. attack violated the right to life of those aboard the boat and may have constituted murder by some of those involved.<\/span><\/li>\n
  2. As the incident did not occur during an armed conflict, there was no requirement to mark the aircraft as a military aircraft.<\/span><\/li>\n
  3. Had the law of armed conflict applied because the situation qualified as an armed conflict (it did not), the rule prohibiting perfidious attack would not have applied since U.S. forces likely did not intend to deceive the adversary to secure a military advantage.<\/span><\/li>\n
  4. Even if U.S. forces did want to deceive those aboard the boat to achieve a military advantage, the prohibition on perfidious attack arguably only applies to situations in which the goal is to kill or wound, not to damage or destroy objects like drugs and boats transporting them (which may have been the case in this strike).<\/span><\/li>\n
  5. Only military aircraft may conduct attacks during an international armed conflict. Whether this rule applies to non-international armed conflict is less settled.<\/span><\/li>\n
  6. To qualify as a military aircraft during an armed conflict, the prevailing view is that aircraft must be marked as such, at least while engaged in combat operations.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
  7. If the limitation of attacks to military aircraft applies during a non-international armed conflict, and such a conflict had been underway (it was not), the use of an unmarked aircraft to conduct the Sept. 2 attack would have been a LOAC violation.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    The confused and confusing discussion that resulted when the use of a military aircraft to conduct the Sept. 2 attack came to light underscores the importance of first identifying the applicable body of law before rendering legal analysis. It also drives home the unintended knock-on consequences of asserting unsupportable legal claims, as this administration has repeatedly done. Indeed, but for its legally incorrect claim that a non-international armed conflict was underway at the time, the use of an aircraft that was not marked as military would have raised no additional legal issues at all beyond the unlawfulness of the strike itself.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Did the Sept. 2 strike on suspected drug traffickers using an unmarked aircraft violate the prohibition on perfidy, or other LOAC rules, had there been an armed 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